25 Years of Justice and Development Party (AKP) Rule: Turkey from Dependency to a Global Economic and Tech Competitor

Dr. Hussein Morgan, Professor of Political Science:

• Turkey has shifted from external dependence to weapons manufacturing and technological advancement.
• The public discourse of the street has become more realistic, moving away from the illusions of the old elites.
• The party succeeded in presenting a conservative democratic model that fits citizens’ aspirations.
• Early economic achievements created a new collective memory of social welfare.
• The concept of citizenship has changed, transforming the bureaucratic apparatus into a service for citizens.
• Confronting economic and social challenges is the primary test facing the government.

Interview by: Hamid Rady

Twenty-five years after the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in Turkey, the party’s experience stands at a critical juncture. This mandates a reading of the transformations the country has witnessed since 2002 and an assessment of their impact on society, the state, and Turkey’s position in its regional and international surroundings.

Over a quarter of a century, the party’s presence was not limited to managing governance; rather, its experience was tied to broad transformations in the relationship between citizens and state institutions, alongside the emergence of a new generation whose political and social awareness took shape under the party’s governments.

Despite the successes achieved over past years, significant challenges are imposed by the upcoming phase. After a quarter-century of rule, the AKP finds itself facing a generation that did not live through pre-2002 Turkey. Consequently, this generation looks at past achievements from a different angle and judges the present according to new aspirations.

In this interview for the “Insan Center for Media Studies” with Prof. Dr. Hussein Morgan, Professor at the Faculty of Political Science and International Relations at Ankara Yildirim Bayezid University, we discuss the trajectory of the Justice and Development Party over a quarter-century and the transformations it brought about in Turkish society. We review the most prominent gains and challenges of this experience, reaching the most important question: How can the party maintain its political and social capital amid the economic, social, and political transformations Turkey is witnessing, and what does it need to ensure its continued presence in the coming period?

How do you explain the emergence of the AKP as an expression of deep social transformations in Turkey?

The AKP emerged during a deep social, economic, and political crisis in Turkish society, particularly in the late 1990s. This was caused by the Kemalist system—specifically its pressure on conservatives in Turkey—as well as the so-called “Postmodern Coup d’état” by the military against politics and military intervention in political affairs, at a time when everything in the country was changing.

In the late 1990s, social and economic conditions were not good, especially with the onset of an economic crisis in 2001, where the people were indeed deeply affected.

Incidentally, people lost their trust in politicians and political parties in Turkey, and the public began searching for a new model, a new candidate, or a new face in politics. There was a major vacuum in society because all the old politicians had truly failed in politics and state management.

The emergence and establishment of the party with a new character, a new face, and a new discourse deeply impacted society. Therefore, just one year later, in the 2002 elections, the party won the election and secured the most seats in the Turkish Parliament.

In truth, the AKP’s victory in the 2002 elections was a reflection of the public search for a new figure, a new party, or a new political movement in society.

How did the party manage to build a feeling among broad segments of society that they were now represented in political life?

The party succeeded in building a feeling and perception among broad segments of Turkish society that they had become clearly and successfully represented in political life.

When we ask how it was able to build this feeling in society and how this succeeded, it connects directly to the AKP’s strategy immediately after its founding.

In truth, the party—and particularly its founders—understood the logic, mindset, and philosophy of the people very well. Incidentally, they came from a conservative and Islamic background, so they knew exactly what the people wanted.

Certainly, everyone who played a role in founding the AKP understood the shifts and changes in the world, especially in the early 2000s when the world entered a new phase. Following the events of September 11, 2001, as we know, everything changed, and the United States implemented a new strategy based on global security, attempting to expand its influence worldwide, specifically in the Islamic world.

The AKP tried to establish and develop a new concept based on conservative thought and a democratic movement. Even the party’s identity was termed “Conservative Democratic” or “Democratic Conservative,” which was considered something new.

When looking at political movements in Turkey, there were Islamists, liberals, nationalists, and leftists. But now, there were people from an Islamic background presenting a new image to society based on democratic values and an orientation toward the West, especially European countries. The European Union occupied an important place in the party’s program and agenda.

At the same time, the party focused on developing relations with the Islamic world and various actors in international politics. This drove the public to embrace this movement and concept. Conservative and religious individuals were using liberal and democratic discourse grounded in conservative and religious values. This was not alien to the sentiments of the public or the values of Turkish society, leading to the success of the AKP’s strategy. It became a true representative in Turkish politics and succeeded in creating a new character and identity within Turkish political life.

There is no doubt that the party succeeded in cultivating a sense among wide segments of Turkish society that they were clearly represented in political life based on these factors.

What was the impact of the early economic and service achievements on the mental image held by Turkish citizens?

The party’s economic and service achievements in its early years represented the primary factor in its acceptance and the public’s rally around it. It created a positive and beneficial image in the minds of the people and society, especially since it was born out of a deep economic crisis that Turkish society had been suffering from, which had affected it severely—leading to company and factory closures, bank bankruptcies, and bringing Turkey’s budget close to insolvency. Turkey was forced to borrow from international institutions at very high interest rates, and the state at the time was effectively under the control of these international lending institutions.

When the AKP government came to power led by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, it delivered crucial strategic achievements. Society witnessed prosperity and saw new horizons in essential services, forming a significant emotional and collective memory regarding overcoming hardships, creating services, and expanding state infrastructure through hospitals, airports, and other projects.

What the AKP government provided made the public deeply attached to the party due to the services delivered, as reflected in the party’s voter turnout over more than two decades.

How did the party succeed in combining conservative identity with economic openness in its initial political experience?

The AKP in Turkey succeeded in formulating a model that combined a “conservative identity” with “liberal economic openness.” However, this formula was not the first of its kind in Turkey’s modern political history.

Looking back to 1983, former Prime Minister Turgut Özel preceded this approach upon coming to power. Özel also operated from a conservative background while armed with a fully liberal vision.

Notably in his trajectory, he took charge of economic management in 1980, tasked with implementing the “January 24, 1980” decisions aimed at resolving the suffocating economic crisis gripping the country at the time. Following the 1980 coup, Özel retained his position in economic administration, benefiting from his background as an engineer who had studied and worked in the United States. This gave him deep insight into the causes of American economic success based on a free-market economy and liberal philosophy—a strategy he sought to apply in Turkey.

Özel’s openness was not limited to the West; he pursued an expanded international strategy that included Central Asian states, the Islamic and Arab worlds, alongside specific moves toward Africa.

Based on this historical foundation, it can be said that the AKP relied on Özel’s successful experience in the 1980s, working to develop and build upon it to present an advanced model that successfully married conservative references with liberal economic philosophy.

What made the AKP’s discourse close to the daily life of Turkish citizens?

Primarily, it must be said that one of the earliest successes of the AKP was its political discourse, which served as the cornerstone in the rise of the party in Turkey. From its earliest formulations, it was characterized by its extreme proximity to the pulse of the street, acting as a genuine echo and expressive voice of the people’s aspirations.

This discourse arrived to fill a deep gap left by the dominant political elites of the 1990s—Kemalists, leftists, and even liberals—who were centralized in the capital, Ankara, and lived, particularly their wealthy segments, isolated from the reality of society and its actual concerns.

In contrast, the party offered an unprecedented discursive strategy with a human, populist, and realistic language touching directly upon the citizen’s immediate worries. The party’s founders did not resort to unreal promises or tickling emotions with hard-to-achieve illusions, fully aware of the scale of the suffocating economic, social, and political crises the Turkish people were undergoing at that time.

The primary reasons for the success of this exceptional discourse rest on the following axes:

• Realism and Candor: Engaging the masses in language reflecting the country’s realities and lived experiences while avoiding empty promises.
• Sincerity and Emotion: Delivering a sensitive discourse originating from genuine feeling, creating alignment between the party and popular bases that saw it as sincerely expressing their aspirations.
• Historical Shift in the 2002 Elections: Although the Turkish political arena witnessed earlier democratic transition milestones—such as the Democratic Party’s victory in the 1950 elections after public disaffection with the Republican People’s Party (CHP) amid a lack of alternatives—the 2002 elections presented voters with multiple options. Nonetheless, the public vote leaned heavily toward those who spoke to them with candor and addressed their expectations clearly.

Through this balanced and realistic discursive vision, the AKP was able to achieve a grand and deserved electoral victory in its very first race, recording a rare and unique model in modern Turkish political history.

How did national symbols contribute to reinforcing the public’s connection to the party’s political project?

The AKP utilized symbols successfully, particularly national symbols, leaving a deep impact on the collective consciousness and mindset of the society and public.

The AKP succeeded in deploying symbols effectively, benefiting deeply from national symbols, which left a prominent impact on the general mindset of the Turkish people.

This investment enabled the party to significantly enhance its political legitimacy and boost its credibility on the street. The roots of this approach trace back to the conservative and Islamic background of the party’s founders, who frequently cited historical and religious figures present in national memory.

The party elite relied on an integrated mix of discursive and symbolic dimensions, the main pillars of which can be summarized in the following points:

• Combining National Symbols with Religious Discourse: Utilizing unifying national symbols while offering a genuine religious discourse reflecting the aspirations of popular bases.
• Relying on Historical and Cultural Depth: Drawing upon Turkey’s major historical and cultural legacy, and leveraging political and historical symbols to draft a new political philosophy.
• Enhancing Political Legitimacy: Proceeding from the premise that every political movement in Turkey needs to draw upon political and historical symbols to grant its path and project the necessary legitimacy.

By combining these diverse symbols and integrating them into its political strategy and discourse, the AKP managed to achieve continuous successes over past years.

How did the party’s experience contribute to redefining the relationship between the citizen and the state in Turkish social consciousness?

Before the AKP came to power, Turkish citizens faced many problems due to mistreatment within government institutions, hospitals, and other entities. The state was powerful, as were its institutions, bureaucracy, and employees, contrasted against ordinary citizens who did not feel they held real status or importance before these institutions. Citizenship, in many cases, had limited value against the power of the bureaucratic apparatus.

However, after the AKP came to power in 2002, this situation changed radically. A major transformation occurred in the concept of citizenship and the status of the citizen within the state.

Under the AKP, citizens began demanding their rights before state institutions, becoming stronger and more capable of defending their rights compared to the past. Consequently, the value of citizenship and citizen identity rose within Turkish society.

Furthermore, the perspective of the state and its institutions toward citizens shifted; the bureaucracy, military, and civil servants became increasingly aware that their responsibility was to serve citizens.

This represents a major shift compared to the pre-2002 situation, where it used to be said that bureaucracy worked to serve the citizen, but actual practice did not always reflect that.

In the past, elites controlled various aspects of life, while ordinary citizens lacked a real, influential position in society. After the AKP came to power, legal amendments and new instructions directed at civil servants and the bureaucratic apparatus contributed to changing this equation.

Hence, it can be said that one of the major transformations during the twenty-five years of AKP rule was the shift in the concept of citizen and citizenship in Turkey, as well as the enhancement of the citizen’s standing in relation to state institutions.

What was the impact of the AKP’s experience on shaping the consciousness of the generation that grew up during its years in power (the new generation)?

When we talk today about a quarter-century of the AKP in power, we are also talking about a new generation that grew up under the party’s governments. Most university graduates today have known no government other than the AKP government, especially since many currently graduating from universities were born in 2002 or 2003, during the party’s era.

The same applies to a segment of those who joined the bureaucracy at an early age after graduating from university; their consciousness and experience within state institutions were formed under AKP rule, knowing no other political or governmental experience.

This reality carries both positives and negatives. The older generation, particularly those in their fifties and sixties, can easily compare what has changed in Turkey over past years because they lived through Turkey before the AKP came to power. As for the new generation, they know old Turkey only through what they hear about it, having not experienced the hardships and problems existing during that phase.

For this reason, the new generation today criticizes certain conditions in Turkey, which can be viewed as one of the negative aspects of not having lived through a different experience or compared between two distinct eras.

On the other hand, AKP governments focused on building a new society with a different consciousness and broader horizons, placing great emphasis on education. This included expanding the construction of schools and universities, alongside adopting a strategy based on establishing a university in every Turkish city.

Turkey comprises 81 cities, and every city now has its own universities. According to this approach, this contributed to expanding educational opportunities for youth and achieving greater equality of opportunity, enabling a new generation to enroll in universities and receive education in their home regions.

Furthermore, 12 years of education—from primary through middle and high school—became compulsory in Turkey. As a result, the new generation has become more educated compared to previous generations, whether in fields of education and culture or regarding opportunities available to youth.

Thus, it can be said that AKP governments applied strategies that impacted the formation of a new consciousness within Turkish society, providing the new generation with greater opportunities than those available to prior generations.

Therefore, the new generation in Turkey enjoys more opportunities in terms of educational prospects and resources compared to their parents and grandparents.

How might current economic and social transformations affect the party’s mental image within Turkish society?

Certainly, regional conditions and domestic developments in Turkey have imposed new challenges in recent years, directly affecting social life—foremost among them being economic conditions and the crisis the country is undergoing.

The government has attempted in recent years to take steps to address this situation, but it is difficult to say it has succeeded so far in reaching the desired results, as the strategy pursued to improve economic conditions has not fully achieved its goals.

Therefore, the economic crisis has come to represent a major difficulty for society and an important challenge facing the government’s future in Turkey.

On the other hand, the government achieved successes in several fields, particularly in the energy, defense, and technology sectors. The new generation benefited from this vision; university graduates, especially engineering graduates, became capable of working in advanced companies and institutions, with some playing an important role in Turkey’s rise on the international stage and strengthening its presence in international relations.

However, Turkish society is simultaneously undergoing a major transformation, and new challenges have begun to emerge, especially among youth and university graduates. Part of this generation has begun to lose hope in the future or feel a lack of clarity regarding the goals upon which they can build their future, posing a major challenge for both society and the government.

Furthermore, new political developments inside Turkey, along with political shifts in the region, directly affect youth and society.

Despite the achievements and successes realized by the AKP over past years, the new generation has begun asking more questions than before about its future and the nature of the upcoming phase.

As I noted earlier, this generation did not live through the hardships present in Turkey prior to the AKP coming to power, but it faces different challenges today, particularly in the economic and social spheres. Some young people cannot find employment after graduation, leading among some to a loss of confidence in their ability to build a future, alongside declining trust in the government and politicians.

Other youth-related challenges are also emerging, including rising levels of violence and crime among them, alongside challenges tied to values, ethics, and other social issues.

These developments signal the emergence of new threats and challenges facing the future of Turkish society. While the government is trying to take real and deep steps to address some of these problems, the world is changing rapidly, as is the region. It is only natural that these transformations reflect on the behavior of citizens and youth, as well as on the new generation’s way of thinking and its outlook toward society and the future.

How do you evaluate the experience regarding the state’s status and its regional and international role?

The AKP’s experience in Turkish politics imparted a new confidence, identity, and perspective to Turkish society, particularly regarding Turkey’s position in international relations in recent years.

We see clearly that Turkey’s role has changed radically in the region, whether in the Middle East or globally. Turkey, as a NATO member, enjoys deep relations with the West. Before the AKP came to power, its foreign policy for decades was largely tied to the interests of the United States and Western nations, but this situation began to change noticeably.

In the past, Turkey relied heavily on the West, particularly the United States, regarding security and arms purchases. Today, it has transformed into a state that manufactures a large portion of its security needs and develops its own weapons and defense systems, which has contributed to altering Turkey’s role and standing in international relations.

The drone sector stands out as a prime example of this transformation; Turkish technology in this field experienced rapid growth, with Turkey acquiring approximately 65% of the drone market under this framework. Progress in this sector helped place Turkey in a position completely different from where it stood in the past.

Turkey has also come to play an increasing role in negotiations and communications aimed at resolving crises and conflicts, whether regionally or internationally, becoming an important party in mediation efforts.

This was clearly demonstrated in the war between Russia and Ukraine, where Turkey managed to communicate directly with both parties to the conflict, Moscow and Kyiv. Despite its NATO membership, Turkey maintained its capacity to communicate with Russia and President Vladimir Putin, allowing it to act as a mediator between both sides.

In addition, Turkey adopted a more open policy over past years toward various regions of the world, including Africa, Central Asia, East Asia, Latin America, and South America. This openness contributed to expanding Turkey’s presence and international relations, enhancing its standing as a country with a growing presence on the global stage.

Consequently, it can be said that Turkey changed its position and role in the international system, becoming more capable of influencing a number of international and regional files.

This vision and strategy contributed to granting Turkish society a new and different awareness of their country’s standing, driving them to look toward broader horizons in international relations and global politics.

What elements does the party need to maintain its social capital in the coming phase?

The AKP needs several elements to maintain its capital in Turkish society and sustain its presence in Turkish politics.

At the forefront of these elements is strengthening the Turkish economy, as it represents one of the greatest challenges facing the future of the party and the government. If the government fails to address the economic crisis, it will continue to face new problems and difficulties within society, even if it manages to win upcoming elections, particularly given that a segment of citizens has begun losing trust in the government.

Therefore, improving the economic situation represents a fundamental issue for preserving the credibility of the government and party inside the country. Although the government pursues active strategies and has made progress in areas such as foreign policy, energy, technology, and defense, looking at domestic conditions reveals clear problems, making the economy an essential priority.

The second element is education. Despite the rising numbers of university graduates, the educational system and its curricula need change and development to match labor market needs.

With the increasing number of university graduates, certain companies, factories, agricultural sectors, and livestock sectors face difficulty finding the labor force they need, because many young people do not wish to work in these fields after earning university degrees. This is an important issue regarding Turkey’s future and stability, requiring the relationship between education and labor market requirements to be addressed.

In contrast, the conditions of other sectors, such as health, industry, and technology, appear largely good at present; thus, citizens do not necessarily expect radical or revolutionary shifts from the government in these fields.

However, the economy remains the most pressing issue, alongside the necessity of setting new goals and horizons for youth and the new generation. The party’s ability to handle these files—especially the economy and education—will serve as an important factor in determining how it continues its political journey in the upcoming phase.