Studies

The Official Egyptian Discourse on the Anniversary of Morsi’s Death and the 2013 Events: An Analytical Study of the Content of Media Campaigns

  • Official media focuses on reframing events and classifying political actors according to a unilateral vision of the regime.
  • The discourse aims to shape a “foundational symbol” for the status quo and reinforce the binary of stability versus chaos.
  • Strict mechanisms for guidance and editorial control in covering anniversaries and pivotal political milestones.
  • Repeated warnings against opposition “cyber” campaigns and the tactics of information warfare and digital space.
  • It is crucial to measure public response to official discourses and develop media literacy programs to counter disinformation.
  • Enhancing transparency, protecting pluralism, and establishing independent platforms are the most critical guarantees for professional balance in crisis coverage.

Insan for Media – Studies Department:

Introduction

The official Egyptian media discourse constitutes one of the regime’s most important tools for influencing public awareness and managing political perception, particularly in contexts related to prominent historical and political events.

This discourse frequently adopts offensive communication strategies toward opposition forces, chief among them the Muslim Brotherhood. This communicative intensity multiplies during occasions tied to pivotal political milestones, such as the anniversary of the death of former President Mohamed Morsi on June 17, 2019, and the anniversaries of the events of June 30 and July 3, 2013. These occasions represent annual milestones during which political narratives are recalled and consolidated, making the accompanying media discourse a rich material for research and analysis in terms of structure, vocabulary, and communicative messages.

From this standpoint, this study seeks to analyze the nature of official Egyptian discourse during these occasions, monitor the characteristics and contents of the accompanying media campaigns, and uncover the most prominent messages directed at the public in this context.

Research Problem and Questions

The research problem is centered on the following main question:

“What are the characteristics of the official Egyptian discourse during political occasions related to the anniversary of former President Mohamed Morsi’s death and the events of June 30 and July 3? What vocabulary and communicative mechanisms do media campaigns rely on to construct their messages during these occasions?”

From this main question, the following sub-questions branch out:

  • What media frames are used to present these events through official discourse?
  • What is the nature of the political and symbolic messages passed to the public?

Research Objectives

This research seeks to achieve the following objectives:

  1. Analyze the linguistic and lexical structure of official Egyptian discourse during the political occasions under study.
  2. Uncover the media frames used in formulating the directed messages.
  3. Deconstruct the nature of the media campaigns accompanying these annual occasions and their communicative mechanisms.
  4. Monitor the targeted communicative messages (direct and indirect) and determine their political significance.

Methodology and Tools

The study relies on the descriptive-analytical method, utilizing content analysis in both its quantitative and qualitative dimensions, integrated with discourse analysis and media framing analysis approaches.

This is applied to a purposive sample of official media coverage and campaigns during the time periods associated with the occasions under study, in order to monitor statistical frequencies and interpret contextual and symbolic meanings.

Study Elements

  • First Axis: The theoretical framework of official discourse and strategies for managing political perception.
  • Second Axis: The historical and political context of the occasions under study (determinants and dimensions).
  • Third Axis: Models of intensive media campaigns coinciding with the events under study.
  • Fourth Axis: Analysis of the vocabulary of official discourse and its political and symbolic meanings.
  • Fifth Axis: Targeted messages from directed media campaigns aimed at the public.
  • Conclusion and Recommendations.

First: The Theoretical Framework of Official Discourse and Strategies for Managing Political Perception

This study proceeds from defining the basic concepts and terms explaining the research phenomenon, chief among them the concept of “official media discourse.” This refers to the matrix of messages, significances, and meanings produced and broadcasted by media outlets and communication platforms affiliated with the authorities or expressing their orientations (whether via television, press, radio, or digital platforms), which are presented to the public within specific political and social contexts.

The function of this discourse is not limited to the abstract transmission of news and events; it extends to include the mechanisms of their formulation, the selection of their linguistic vocabulary and symbolic structures, and the embedding of directed messages that contribute to shaping collective consciousness and reconstructing the social and political reality of the recipient.

The discourse under study consists of several structural and interactive elements, including:

  • Media Language: This includes the lexical vocabulary and the expressive style used (whether it takes an explanatory, directive, or mobilizing path).
  • Media Frames: The strategy through which issues are presented to highlight specific aspects and obscure others, with the aim of directing the public’s understanding.
  • Visual and Symbolic Structure: Images, logos, and accompanying effects that support the communicative message and endow it with specific semantic dimensions.
  • Political and Social Context: The general environment and circumstances surrounding the production of the discourse, which grant it its justification and directive function.
  • Target Audience: The societal segments for whom the discourse is formulated and directed to influence their positions and perceptions.

The study of official media discourse derives its methodological and scientific importance from several indicators, most notably:

  • Understanding the mechanisms of manufacturing public opinion and directing it toward pivotal issues and events.
  • Deconstructing the impact of official orientations on the dominant political culture and the general scene.
  • Uncovering strategies of bias, direction, or ideological mobilization in communicative messages.
  • Providing a scientific critical reading that enables the recipient to deconstruct media content and its implicit connotations.[1]

The concept of “political narratives” is one of the essential terminological cornerstones of this study. Political narratives are defined as explanatory frameworks and organized storytelling structures deployed in the public square to present events, facts, and intellectual propositions in a systematic, persuasive style. They aim to influence public perception, shape attitudes, and direct political behavior.

These narratives do not stop at the boundaries of linear information transmission; they reproduce and reformulate reality through the intentional selection of certain events and interpreting them in line with specific political values or goals, serving primarily the legitimacy of ruling regimes or political actors and their positions.

Political narratives are characterized by a set of structural and functional traits, most notably:

  • Selectivity: Balancing the highlighting of specific events and details with the deliberate omission or marginalization of others.
  • Explanatory Dimensions: Moving beyond the abstract presentation of facts toward imparting directed meanings and significances that serve the targeted context.
  • Persuasive Tendency: Aiming to win over public opinion and attract support through tools of linguistic and symbolic argumentation.
  • Connection to Identity: Centering around the determinants of collective and cultural identity targeted by ruling regimes to enhance loyalty.
  • Dynamism and Flexibility: The ability to take shape, adapt, and mutate in tandem with political variables and emerging historical contexts.

Political narratives vary according to the function they perform in the public sphere, with prominent models including:

  • National Security Narrative: Used as a framework to justify security and sovereign policies and measures.
  • Development and Reform Narrative: Deployed to support and pass economic and social orientations and plans.
  • Counter-Terrorism Narrative: Emerges as an explanatory framework in domestic and international policies to confront security threats.
  • Resistance or Liberation Narrative: Formed in struggle contexts to build fronts of political opposition.

The study of political narratives integrates and falls within the field of “political communication,” as it is the scientific umbrella concerned with researching how media outlets are deployed and narrative structures are leveraged to direct political interactions and manufacture public opinion.[2]

Second: The Historical and Political Context of the Occasions Under Study (Determinants and Dimensions)

The media discourse under study is linked to a pivotal historical and political context which the Egyptian state witnessed during the events of June and July 2013. This is a stage when political readings and analyses diverged in interpreting its nature and outcomes. One analytical trend views it as the product of political and security arrangements that led to ending the rule of the first elected civilian president after the 2011 revolution and putting the country on a different political path, using the premise of the “June 30 conspiracy” as an explanatory framework for this transformation.

The features of this phase began after the election of former President Mohamed Morsi in 2012, as disputes and political polarization intensified between the presidency and opposition forces regarding state management files, the drafting of the constitution, and economic and security conditions, amid interactions in which the roles of forces associated with the former regime and official state institutions overlapped.

The manifestations of this dispute became evident with the rise of the “Tamarod” (Rebellion) movement—which analytical propositions indicate received financial support from the United Arab Emirates. The movement announced the collection of popular signatures to withdraw confidence from the president and call for early presidential elections. This coincided with massive demonstrations in several Egyptian cities against the president, met by demonstrations supporting him, whose coverage in some media outlets faced criticism regarding balance and objectivity.

With the accelerating pace of events, the June 30 demonstrations formed the prelude to the path that led to the July 3, 2013 announcement and the rapid security and political interactions that followed, among the most prominent milestones of which was the dispersal of the Rabaa al-Adawiya and al-Nahda sit-ins in August of the same year.

The political scene at the time was dominated by the alliance of civilian opposition forces represented by the “National Salvation Front” (which included prominent figures such as Mohamed ElBaradei, Hamdeen Sabahi, and Amr Moussa). The Front directed sharp criticism at the ruling regime, focusing on accusations of “Brotherhoodization of the state” and political and economic mismanagement, as well as accusations related to compromising the determinants of national sovereignty—accusations that the team supporting the current regime believes subsequent events have debunked.

On the military and regional levels, the military and security establishment played a pivotal role in managing the crisis, in parallel with regional movements by countries supporting political change. Political readings recurred regarding contacts and meetings that preceded the change, which materialized in the grace period (48 hours) granted by the General Command of the Armed Forces to political forces to reach a settlement. Given that a consensus formula was not achieved between the presidency and the opposition, the scene concluded with the declaration of the July 3, 2013 statement, which ended the democratic political process existing at the time and initiated a new transitional phase.[3]

The Events of July 3, 2013, and Their Political and Security Repercussions

This phase was contextually founded on the statement issued on July 3, 2013, in which the Minister of Defense at the time, General Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, announced the removal of President Mohamed Morsi, the suspension of the existing constitution, and the assignment of the head of the Supreme Constitutional Court to temporarily manage the affairs of the country during the transitional phase.

This measure was followed by extensive field and security repercussions, including intensive legal and security crackdowns targeting the leaders and bases of the Muslim Brotherhood, leading to its official classification as a terrorist organization.

That period was punctuated by the dispersal of the Rabaa al-Adawiya and al-Nahda sit-ins, and the accompanying widespread confrontations with groups rejecting the measures of July 3, resulting in casualties, injuries, and a wide wave of arrests.

This era witnessed major field milestones around which statistical and human rights narratives diverged, most prominent among them:

  • The Republican Guard Headquarters Events (July 8, 2013): Circulating data indicates that they resulted in 61 deaths and more than 435 injuries.
  • The Memorial Monument – El-Manassa Events (July 27, 2013): Estimates recorded the death of about 80 people and the injury of more than 300 others.
  • The Dispersal Operation of the Rabaa and al-Nahda Sit-ins (August 14, 2013): This is the most controversial milestone; official and human rights estimates of the number of victims diverged. The Egyptian Forensic Medicine Authority recorded 377 deaths, while the report issued by the National Council for Human Rights documented 632 deaths, in parallel with estimates and documentations by other human rights bodies that recorded numbers exceeding these statistics.
  • Ramses Square Events (August 16, 2013): Confrontations there led to the killing of 173 people and the injury of more than 1,330, in addition to an extended arrest campaign.

These successive developments led to the continuation of a state of extended political and social tension, dedicating a state of sharp division in the Egyptian scene according to this analytical context explaining the events and their repercussions.[4]

The Death of President Mohamed Morsi (June 17, 2019) and Its Human Rights Repercussions

The date of June 17, 2019, witnessed the death of former President Mohamed Morsi inside a Cairo courtroom, following a fainting spell and his collapse inside the cage during his trial session. This incident sparked mixed reactions and widespread controversy on both international and domestic levels.

Following his death, sharp criticism was issued by international human rights organizations focusing on his detention conditions. Some of these reports put forward the hypothesis of deliberate medical neglect and continuous deprivation of specialized healthcare and necessary medications, as well as the repercussions of long periods of solitary confinement as factors that contributed to the deterioration of his health condition, considering it akin to an indirect elimination.

In a related context, members of the British Parliament (within an independent review panel) referred to a report on detention conditions based on testimonies and human rights briefings. The report noted that the parliamentary delegation did not receive an official response from the Egyptian authorities regarding a request to visit his place of detention to ascertain his health status before his death.

These developments and reports formed rich material for an extended debate between the official narrative of the Egyptian authorities on one hand, and the narratives of opposition forces and international human rights organizations on the other, which considered that the circumstances of the death exceeded the limits of the natural causes mentioned in the official statement, placing it in the context of systematic targeting.[5]

Third: Models of Intensive Media Campaigns Coinciding with the Events Under Study

This axis deals with an analytical monitoring of selected groups of press and media coverage that accompanied the three occasions under research over the past decade. This monitoring aims to elucidate the features of official discourse, determine its targets, and deconstruct its communicative messages, tracing the paths of offensive discourse strategies directed toward opposition forces, foremost among them the Muslim Brotherhood. It also monitors the development and dynamism witnessed by those media campaigns and the nature of their contextual and content variance from year to year.

Since 2013, systematic communication campaigns have recurred in the print and digital press, aiming to fix and reinforce the official narrative around these three historical milestones. They work to strip political and social legitimacy from the Muslim Brotherhood, refute the propositions of its members, and confront the discourses of various opposition forces rejecting the existing political path.

Contents of Newspapers and Websites:

The research begins this applied monitoring by analyzing the discursive content of Al-Ahram newspaper, as a historical model expressing the determinants of media discourse in the national and state-owned press toward these events. Below is a presentation and analysis of models of that coverage:

  • “Fouad Allam: The Muslim Brotherhood conspired against Sinai with terrorist groups.”[6]
  • “The ‘Foreign Ministry’ denounces statements by the spokesperson for the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the death of Mohamed Morsi.”[7]
  • “The natural death of Mohamed Morsi exposed those lurking against the state.”[8]
  • “June 30… 10 years… Major General Alaa Abdel Zahir recounts details of Brotherhood crimes around Ittihadiya.”[9]
  • “The Brotherhood’s crimes and the actions of the terrorist group extend throughout history, and their record is full.”[10]
  • “The Brotherhood’s crimes against the state do not fall by prescription… and President Sisi sided with the people on June 30.”[11]

As for Youm7 newspaper, its coverage over the past decade has been characterized by adopting intensive offensive communication strategies toward the Muslim Brotherhood.

In a striking contextual development coinciding with the occasions under study in 2026, the newspaper launched a wide-scale media campaign under the title: “The Youm7 Initiative to Document the Crimes of the Brotherhood, Protect National Memory, and Expose the Group’s Terrorism.”

Through an initial reading of the structure of this discourse and its directives, it is noted that the timing of launching the initiative and its communicative contents aim to provide counter-frames to the propositions and voices calling for resolving the political stagnation or opening paths for national reconciliation. The newspaper seeks through its published materials to reproduce the narrative of political and social ban and rejection of the group. Below is a monitoring and analysis of the most prominent models of journalistic treatment in this campaign:

  • “Editor-in-Chief: Youm7’s initiative to document the Brotherhood’s crimes protects national memory and exposes the group’s terrorism… and proposals for a martyrs’ museum, teaching their heroics, and producing artistic works to immortalize their sacrifices for future generations.”[12]
  • “The July 3 statement… put an end to attempts to change the identity of the Egyptian state and its Brotherhoodization, and eliminated the terrorist group… it will remain a symbol of recovering national awareness, correcting the political path, and an icon for rebuilding state institutions.”[13]
  • “June 30 saved Egypt from a dark fate at the hands of the terrorist group… Senate Speaker confirms: The July 3 declaration gladdened the hearts of Egyptians and translated their legitimate demands… and members of the Council: The revolution succeeded in moving Egypt to a new phase.”[14]
  • “Dr. Mohamed Mokhtar Gomaa, Minister of Endowments, in his first interview after renewing confidence in him: June wrote an exceptional history… and President Sisi carried out the largest national rescue operation… and the Brotherhood is an exclusionary, racist terrorist group that claims to be the chosen one.”[15]
  • “The Public Prosecution’s statement on the death of Mohamed Morsi Al-Ayyat: He spoke in court for 5 minutes before the session was recessed for deliberation… he collapsed unconscious inside the cage… the initial medical examination confirmed the absence of injuries… he arrived at the hospital dead at 4:50.”[16]
  • “State Information Service: Human Rights Watch tweets about Mohamed Morsi’s death contained fallacies.”[17]

Al-Watan newspaper followed the same path as Youm7, examples of which include:

  • “The Brotherhood sought to destroy state institutions… and the June 30 revolution saved Egypt.”[18]
  • “A founder of the Tamarod movement: Israel was the primary beneficiary of the continuation of Brotherhood rule… and the June 30 revolution saved Egypt from the chaos plot in the Middle East.”[19]
  • “The July 3 statement confirmed that the Muslim Brotherhood has no place inside Egypt.”[20]
  • “The July 3 statement… a historical moment that restored Egypt’s identity and saved it from abduction and division at the hands of the Brotherhood.”[21]

By analyzing the media content of Al-Dostour newspaper, whose journalistic treatments were characterized by clear discursive sharpness in handling the occasions under study over the past decade, we find an insistence on the continuity of the exclusionary approach toward the opposition. This was reinforced by editorial directives issued by the Chairman of the Board and Editor-in-Chief, Mohamed Al-Baz, in March 2026, which mandated the necessity of launching an intensive communication campaign toward the Muslim Brotherhood. This ensured the continuity of publishing digital and print journalistic materials aimed at condemning the organization and linking it to paths of violence in the Egyptian scene since the events of June 30, 2013.

The newspaper’s editorial approach focused on deploying “storytelling” techniques in constructing and shaping journalistic materials to impart a persuasive and influential character to the targeted meanings, in parallel with adopting counter-discourse frames against all propositions supporting an end to political stagnation or activating national reconciliation. Below is a monitoring of the most prominent contents and headlines published by the newspaper in this context:

  • “The people protect their identity… heroes of the epic… residents of Bayn Al-Sarayat: We confronted the Brotherhood’s crimes and ransomed the June 30 revolution with our lives, and President Sisi restored security and safety to Egypt.”[22]
  • “June 30 saved Egypt from the darkness of the Brotherhood… live testimonies from participants in the revolution.”[23]
  • “The Brotherhood’s crimes will not stop… and their hands will remain stained with the blood of innocents.”[24]
  • “Sisi in confrontation with the group… how he saved Egypt from Brotherhood rule on July 3.”[25]
  • “Al-Baz: Morsi entered prison sick, was afflicted with malignant brain tumors, and died naturally.”[26]
  • “Mokhtar Nouh drops a surprise: The Brotherhood is behind Mohamed Morsi’s death out of oppression in his prison… what is the story?”[27]
  • “The most dangerous financial organization of the Brotherhood… referring 65 defendants in the largest money smuggling case to the Criminal Court.”[28]

Contents of Visual Media:

Moving to visual media discourse, it is observed that it aligns structurally with its written counterpart; it reflects the same directive features and value trends, with an operational development taking shape in deploying communicative tools and methods.

On the level of talk shows, TV host Ahmed Moussa announced in early 2026 the documentation of the Muslim Brotherhood’s crimes through his book titled Secrets. During his program On My Responsibility, broadcast on the Sada El-Balad channel on February 25, 2026, he pointed out that reminding people of what he described as “Brotherhood crimes” requires reading this publication.[29]

In a previous episode of the same program on September 30, 2024, the discourse focused on the role of the armed forces in protecting the state from the Brotherhood organization, and that it prevented the formation of what he described as a “Revolutionary Guard” in Egypt, emphasizing its moral value among Egyptians.[30]

In the context of the special treatment of the July 3 events, in an episode broadcast by the channel on July 3, 2023, he described the scene as the “Day of Deliverance,” adopting the frame of the armed forces siding with the popular will, and recalling statistical estimates amounting to 33 million citizens who took to the squares, within the context of reinforcing the official narrative of events.[31]

As for his comment on the death of former President Mohamed Morsi, his discourse on June 17, 2019, was characterized by sharpness; he described him as a “killer and a spy,” favoring the hypothesis of natural death within an emotional, offensive tone.[32]

For his part, TV host Amr Adib continued to support the official narrative through his program El-Hekaya broadcast on the MBC Masr channel. In a June 30, 2024 episode, he asserted that were it not for the intervention of President Sisi and the formulation of the July 3 statement, security and terrorist threats would have exacerbated in the country and citizens would have turned into refugees.[33]

In his comment on the incident of Morsi’s death on June 17, 2019, he declared his lack of sympathy with the event, describing the Muslim Brotherhood as a failed organization, and renewing the emphasis on the role of presidential intervention in protecting the state.[34]

In the same context, TV host Nashat El-Deehy, in his program With Pen and Paper broadcast on the TEN channel, focused on deploying occasions associated with June 30 and July 3 to strip legitimacy from the Muslim Brotherhood. In an episode on May 9, 2026, he pointed to the existence of an “international plot” shared by the group with media and intelligence platforms aimed at casting doubt on Egyptian economic indicators, linking this proposition to the anniversary of the revolution.[35]

In an episode on November 26, 2024, El-Deehy described propositions supporting reconciliation with the Brotherhood as “treason,” emphasizing that political intervention and the official path saved the state from the consequences of their rule.[36] He also adopted, in the June 17, 2019 episode, the official narrative of the natural death of President Morsi, denying the controversial hypotheses raised around it.[37]

In a similar manner, TV host Mostafa Bakry focused in his program Facts and Secrets on the frame of accusing the Muslim Brotherhood of national treason, emphasizing the sovereign approach of the state in confronting them.[38]

In a related framework, TV host Mohamed Al-Baz stated in the program 90 Minutes on June 18, 2019, that manifestations of sympathy with Morsi’s death do not express the collective position of the Egyptian people, considering that the practices of the group dragged the country into a vortex of violence and armed operations.[39]

Contents of Egyptian Drama:

In the same context, Egyptian television drama contributed over the past decade to supporting the directives of both media and press discourses. This was done through producing dramatic works that focused on reinforcing communicative frames aimed at stripping political and social legitimacy from the Muslim Brotherhood and fixing the official narrative around the historical events under study. The “United Media Services Company”—alongside production bodies expressing the official orientations of the state—took charge of manufacturing a number of political dramatic works, prominent among which were: the series Al-Gama’a (The Group) in its first and second parts, the series Al-Ikhtiyar (The Choice) in its three parts, in addition to the series Ra’s Al-Af’a (The Snake’s Head).

Fourth: Analysis of the Vocabulary of Official Discourse and Its Political and Symbolic Meanings

The results of quantitative and qualitative analysis of the monitored media discourse sample show a matrix of discursive frames and linguistic vocabulary deployed in an intensive, repetitive manner. This aims to fix specific meanings and entrench them in the collective consciousness of the recipient. These frames and their accompanying vocabulary can be classified as follows:

  • “Restoring the State and Saving the Homeland”: The discourse in this frame focuses on highlighting the role of the armed forces and sovereign institutions in protecting the entity of the state, using repetitive vocabulary such as: “saving the state,” “restoring state institutions,” “correcting the path,” and “ending the state of chaos.” This frame aims to present the phase prior to July 3 as a state threatening the structure of the state and its continuity.
  • “Securitization” and Linking Opposition to Terrorism: The discourse sought to shift the nature of competition from its political context to a security and existential context, through deploying a lexical lexicon that links the Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters to security threats. Among its recurring vocabulary are: “terrorist organization,” “extremist groups,” “terrorist arms,” “sleeper cells,” and “external/foreign funding.”
  • “Conspiracy and External Threat”: This frame emerged to interpret political developments as part of a confrontation with external forces rather than a mere internal political dispute. This manifested in the use of vocabulary such as: “external plots,” “regional and international forces,” “foreign agendas,” and “targeting the dismantling of the national state.”
  • “Revolutionary Legitimacy and Mandate”: The official discourse adopted decisive positive evaluative formulations to describe the events of June 30 and July 3, aiming to present a unilateral narrative of the scene that bypasses its political complexities. This embodied in vocabulary such as: “June 30 revolution,” “people’s revolution,” “will of the people,” and “popular mandate.”
  • Sharp Binaries (Stability vs. Chaos): The discourse relied on a strategy of simplifying reality and reducing it to two inevitable options: the regime and official institutions of the state as a guarantor of security, or chaos represented by the opposition and the Brotherhood. Verbal binaries deployed in this context included: “security and stability” versus “chaos and instability,” and “fall of the state” versus “war on terror.”
  • “Stereotyping the Incident of the Death of the Former President” and Responding to Counter-Narratives: In the context of media coverage of the death of former President Mohamed Morsi, the discourse focused on fixing specific dimensions seeking to convince public opinion of the official narrative and deny hypotheses of killing or neglect, using phrases such as: “the former president,” “he passed away during the trial,” and “circumstances of natural death,” versus classifying other propositions as “allegations of non-natural death.”
  • Frame of “Stripping Political and Historical Legitimacy”: The discourse aimed to undermine the political value of the previous experience and deny the continuity of its legitimacy in national memory, through recalling recurring derogatory vocabulary and premises such as: “the period of Brotherhood rule,” “the attempt to Brotherhoodize the state,” and “the exploitation of religion in power.”

Based on the foregoing, the research concludes that the vocabulary and linguistic units deployed within these media frames do not perform a neutral informational function; rather, they represent structural parts in engineering an integrated and directed political narrative, which bases its effect on the following communicative mechanisms and functions:

  • Reconstructing the Reality of Events and Naming Them: By imparting designations that grant legal and revolutionary legitimacy to political transformations, and displacing opposing controversial designations.
  • Reclassifying Parties and Actors: By consolidating the binary of (official state institutions / suspicious terrorist organizations) to deny any political character to the opposition.
  • Reinterpreting Causes and Motivations: By shifting the interpretation from the square of domestic competition and demands for reform to the square of targeting national security and confronting external conspiracies and cross-border plans.
  • Creating Sharp Existential and Moral Binaries: This materialized in the binary of (stability and development / chaos and destruction), to restrict the options and perception of the recipient into a zero-sum binary supporting the status quo.

Political and Symbolic Significances of Official Media Discourse

Based on this, official media discourse on these occasions can be understood as part of an extended and ongoing conflict of political narratives over the historical and political characterization of the 2013 events, and determining their nature between being a “popular revolution” or a “military coup,” as well as being a tool to re-engineer the position of the Muslim Brotherhood in the political scene.

The most prominent political and symbolic significances of this discourse crystallize in the following axes:

  1. Consolidating Political Legitimacy via the “Narrative of Popular Response”: The official discourse seeks to entrench the premise that the movements of June 30 were a broad popular expression against the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood, and that the intervention of the armed forces on July 3 came as a fulfillment and “response” to this popular will. The significance here does not stop at the historical documenting dimension; it extends to perform direct political functions aiming to:
    • Reproduce the legitimacy of the existing political order as an extension of popular will.
    • Strip any revolutionary character or political legitimacy from movements opposing the official path.
  2. Framing the Opposition as an “Existential Threat”: Coinciding with the memories of the events of (June – July) and the death of former President Mohamed Morsi, a communicative discourse is intensified linking the group to a matrix of threats such as: violence, chaos, sabotaging stability, secret work, and cross-border external loyalties. The symbolic significance here lies in referring competition from its pluralistic political square to the square of existential security conflict, granting an objective justification for policies of exclusion and legal restriction.
  3. Representing July 3 as an “Inevitable Correction of Path”: The procedural intervention on the third of July is presented as “saving the nation” and “correcting the state’s path.” This framing carries a symbolic significance manifested in transforming the moment of contested power transition from a political event subject to debate into a historical necessity and an inevitable alternative to save the entity of the state.
  4. Managing Political Memory: Contextual annual occasions turn into a communicative space to rearrange events and direct them, by adjusting the determinants of historical material (what is remembered, how it is presented, and who bears criminal and political responsibility?). This mechanism reveals that the authorities do not content themselves with adjusting the interactions of the present; they seek to govern and interpret the meanings of the past and fix them.
  5. Creating the “Foundational Symbol” of the Political Regime: The events of 2013 turn in the text of official discourse from a mere temporary transitional phase into a clear “foundational moment” upon which the current state is based, granting the scene a symbolic function similar to “foundational legitimacy” in accordance with which laws and general directives for society are formulated.

Based on these data, it becomes clear that official media discourse on these annual occasions exceeds the traditional informational function associated with narrating facts, to practice a deeper role related to producing and fixing political legitimacy, reframing opponents, and drawing the governing boundaries of the acceptable and rejected in the public sphere.

Fifth: Targeted Messages from Directed Media Campaigns Aimed at the Public

The results of analyzing media coverage and published editorial directives over the past decade, leading up to 2026, indicate that the intensive media campaigns directed against the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt are based on a matrix of central messages recurring through traditional media and digital platforms, aiming to formulate a specific collective perception around the group’s roles and its current positioning. The most prominent of these messages and their communicative mechanisms can be limited to the following:

  • Frames of Disinformation and Engineering Fake Content: Campaigns focused on dismantling the historical dimensions of the group by highlighting rumors and misleading news treatments related to the paths of its relationship and clash with the military establishment and civilian opposition forces, as well as monitoring deployment of fabricated digital content for the purpose of manufacturing a state of controversy and confusion for the recipient.
  • Stripping Political Character and Framing Muslim Brotherhood as a “Misleading Communicative Actor”: The discourse deliberately displaced the natural political description from the group, and represented it in the public sphere as a promotional platform or network targeting exclusively “tarnishing the international and local prestige of Egyptian state institutions.”
  • Consolidating Frames of Official Legitimacy and Narratives of Transformation: Recalling the official narrative of events recurred through fixing the decisive revolutionary characterization of June 30 as a “popular revolution,” and framing July 3 in the context of an inevitable “correction of path,” to ensure dominance over public awareness and settle the debate over the legitimacy of the existing regime.
  • Discourse of “Securitization” and Incitement to Chaos: Recurring accusations were directed at the group as being a primary catalyst for instability, and its systematic pursuit to “confuse public opinion” by amplifying the repercussions of economic and social crises to undermine communicative and trust bridges between the citizen and the state.
  • “War of Awareness” and Targeting Youth Groups: Battles of the digital space were formulated within the literature of official discourse as an “existential battle of awareness,” with continuous warning against the group’s exploitation of social networks and interactive platforms to recruit young energies and direct them.
  • Framing “Electronic Committees” and Digital Populism: The discourse emphasized the existence of organized communication networks and directed algorithms operating in a coordinated and systematic manner within what was described as “systematic cyber campaigns” to manufacture artificial public opinion trends antagonistic to the state.
  • Highlighting Frames of Fragmentation and Lack of Organizational Centralization: Media discourse sought to focus on axes of internal division and structural disputes between leaders, aiming to highlight the decline of the organizational and operational capacity of the group compared to its previous environment.
  • Strategy of “Communicative Alternative” and Working from Abroad: Treatments focused on the idea of the group’s shift from tools of restricted field and realistic work to “propaganda and virtual communicative activity” managed through hybrid platforms broadcasting from outside the geographical borders of the Egyptian state, focusing on frames of casting doubt and external agency for regional and international forces.

These messages integrate to redefine the Muslim Brotherhood in official discourse within three major explanatory frames:

  • Existential Security Threat Frame: As a direct threat to stability and cohesion of the national state.
  • Information Warfare Frame: As a cross-border digital media network deploying tactics of psychological and communicative influence.
  • Structural Erosion Frame: Through focusing on manifestations of division and organizational weakness.

These communicative paths overlap to ultimately perform unified strategic functions represented in besieging and refuting narratives of opposition forces, governing and directing internal public opinion, while directing communicative messages to the outside confirming the solidity and steadfastness of the sovereign orientations of the Egyptian state. This proves that these messages do not work in isolation from each other, but rather merge within a complex, multi-level discursive strategy.

Sixth: Conclusion and Recommendations

This study concluded that the official Egyptian discourse on political occasions subject to analysis is characterized by a high degree of structural organization and linguistic intensification. It relies on a vocabulary system with intensive mobilizing and symbolic dimensions, primarily targeting the consolidation of a unified, specific political narrative of historical events and developments.

The results of the analysis also showed the existence of variances and contextual dynamics in media framing mechanisms among the three occasions under research, with continuous reliance on close and integrated discursive tools and interfaces in engineering and constructing communicative messages.

The cumulative research results confirm that the function of official media discourse in this context exceeds traditional informational frames associated with transmitting information and data, to perform an active functional role in shaping public perception, reproducing political and national memory, and adjusting the boundaries of the acceptable and rejected in the public sphere.

Based on the scientific results yielded by the study, we conclude with the following recommendations:

First: On the Professional and Institutional Level:

  • Supporting and establishing independent media platforms and institutions that base their performance on standards of professionalism, balance, and methodological neutrality in covering events.
  • Establishing counter-communication strategies based on systematic and objective documentation of events to present balanced narratives supporting accuracy of information in the public domain.

Second: On the Level of Education and Communicative Awareness:

  • Developing approaches for media literacy and critical awareness for the recipient to disseminate and consolidate scientific and accurate concepts regarding determinants of national security, political conflict, mechanisms of media polarization, and countering terrorism, away from frames of political deployment.

Third: On the Level of Future Studies and Research:

  • Encouraging preparation of comparative academic studies between official media discourses and their unofficial counterparts (opposition and independent) to ascertain distances of variance, and monitor professional and communicative issues in local media environment.
  • Conducting future research and studies aiming to measure audience trends and their digital and realistic interaction with these patterns of directed discourses, to determine their effectiveness and ability to influence levels of political perception.

[1] “The Concept of Media Discourse and its Most Important Elements”, UNESCO website, https://goo.su/3R9VkeO

 [2] “Political Narratives”, Wikipedia, https://goo.su/cy16raK

[3] “June 30.. The Controversy of Revolution and Conspiracy”, Al Jazeera Net, June 30, 2015, https://goo.su/vOCQk

 [4] “The Military Coup in Egypt, July 3, 2013”, Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, July 03, 2013, https://goo.su/alxPfRa

[5] “Death of Mohamed Morsi: What do we know about his prison conditions?”, BBC, June 19, 2019, https://goo.su/7OkXjb

 [6] “Fouad Allam: The Muslim Brotherhood conspired against Sinai with terrorist groups”, Al-Ahram, September 12, 2018, https://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/2011153.aspx

[7] “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs denounces the statements of the spokesperson for the High Commissioner for Human Rights regarding the death of Mohamed Morsi”, Al-Ahram, June 19, 2019, https://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/2235396.aspx

[8] “The natural death of Mohamed Morsi exposed those lying in wait for the state”, Al-Ahram, June 20, 2019, https://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/2236039.aspx

 [9] “June 30.. 10 Years».. Major General Alaa Abdel-Zaher recounts the details of the Brotherhood’s crimes in the vicinity of Al-Ittihadia”, June 30, 2023, https://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/4343048.aspx [10] “The crimes of the Brotherhood and the actions of the terrorist group extend throughout history and its record is full”, Al-Ahram, July 16, 2024, https://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/4903298.aspx

[11] “The Brotherhood’s crimes against the state do not fall by prescription.. and President El-Sisi sided with the people on June 30”, June 1, 2025, https://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/5182609.aspx

[12] “Editor-in-Chief: Youm7’s initiative to document the Brotherhood’s crimes protects the national memory and exposes the group’s terrorism.. and proposals for a martyrs museum, teaching their heroism, and producing artistic works to immortalize their sacrifices for future generations”, Youm7, May 23, 2026, https://goo.su/CCbqu

 [13] “The July 3 Statement.. put an end to attempts to change the identity of the Egyptian state and Brotherwoodize it, and eliminated the terrorist group.. it will remain a symbol of reclaiming national awareness and correcting the political path.. and is considered an icon for rebuilding state institutions”, Youm7, July 04, 2025, https://2h.ae/rNlJw

[14] “June 30 saved Egypt from a dark fate at the hands of the terrorist group.. Senate Speaker confirms: The July 3 declaration delighted the hearts of Egyptians and translated their legitimate demands.. and members of the Council: The revolution succeeded in moving Egypt to a new phase and we are on the right track”, Youm7, July 04, 2021, https://2h.ae/iLzZV

[15] “Dr. Mohamed Mokhtar Gomaa, Minister of Endowments, in the first interview after the renewal of trust in him: ‘June’ wrote an exceptional history.. and President El-Sisi carried out the largest national rescue operation in.. and the Brotherhood is an exclusionary, racist terrorist group that claims to be the chosen one”, Youm7, June 28, 2018, https://2h.ae/NNggc

 [16] “The Public Prosecution’s statement on the death of Mohamed Morsi Al-Ayyat: He spoke in court for 5 minutes before the session was adjourned for deliberation.. he collapsed unconscious inside the cage.. the preliminary medical examination confirmed the absence of injuries.. he arrived at the hospital deceased at 4:50”, Youm7, June 17, 2019, https://2h.ae/gyoqZ

[17] “State Information Service: Human Rights Watch’s tweets about the death of Mohamed Morsi contained fallacies”, Youm7, June 18, 2019, https://2h.ae/caxMr

 [18] “The Brotherhood sought to destroy state institutions.. and the June 30 revolution saved Egypt”, El-Watan, June 26, 2025, https://2h.ae/EcObR

[19] “One of the founders of the ‘Tamarod’ movement: Israel was the primary beneficiary of the continuation of the Brotherhood’s rule.. and the June 30 revolution saved Egypt from the ‘Middle East Chaos’ plot”, El-Watan, June 03, 2025, https://2h.ae/MJlDh

[20] “The July 3 statement confirmed that the Muslim Brotherhood group has no place inside Egypt”, El-Watan, July 03, 2025, https://2h.ae/UsOEt

 [21] “The July 3 statement.. a historic moment that restored Egypt’s identity and saved it from kidnapping and division at the hands of the Brotherhood”, El-Watan, July 03, 2025, https://2h.ae/Asvxg

 [22] “The people protect their identity, the heroes of the epic.. residents of ‘Bein Al-Sarayat’: We confronted the Brotherhood’s crimes and sacrificed our lives for the June 30 revolution, and President El-Sisi restored safety and security to Egypt”, Al-Dostour, June 10, 2026, https://www.dostor.org/5593139

 [23] “June 30 saved Egypt from the darkness of the Brotherhood.. live testimonies from participants in the revolution”, Al-Dostour, June 8, 2026, https://www.dostor.org/5590079

[24] “The Brotherhood’s crimes will not stop.. and their hands will remain stained with the blood of innocents”, Al-Dostour, June 24, 2025, https://www.dostor.org/5117345

 [25] “El-Sisi in confrontation with the group”.. How he saved Egypt from the Brotherhood’s rule on July 3”, Al-Dostour, June 21, 2025, https://www.dostor.org/5114386

 [26] “Al-Baz: Morsi entered prison sick, was suffering from malignant brain tumors, and died naturally”, Al-Dostour, July 8, 2019, https://www.dostor.org/2709906

[27] “Mokhtar Nouh drops a bombshell: The Brotherhood is behind the death of Mohamed Morsi out of oppression in his prison.. What is the story?”, Al-Dostour, June 5, 2022, https://studio.dostor.org/147903

[28] “The most dangerous financial organization of the Brotherhood.. 65 defendants referred to the Criminal Court in the largest money smuggling case”, Sada El-Balad, June 5, 2026, https://www.elbalad.news/6998614

[29] “Ahmed Moussa: My book ‘Secrets’ documents the Brotherhood’s crimes.. and the snake’s head confused the group”, Al-Dostour, February 25, 2026, https://www.dostor.org/5434556

 [30] “Forming a Revolutionary Guard.. Ahmed Moussa reminds Egyptians of the Brotherhood’s crimes”, Besraha, September 30, 2024, https://besraha.com/News/NewsPrint/154128

[31] “Ahmed Moussa: July 3 is the day of salvation.. and the armed forces sided with the people”, Sada El-Balad, July 3, 2023, https://www.elbalad.news/5831402

 [32] “Ahmed Moussa after Morsi’s death: He will remain a killer and a spy to hell and a wretched destination”, Al-Mal website, June 17, 2019, https://2h.ae/BZCix

 [33] “Amr Adib on the June 30 revolution: ‘If it weren’t for El-Sisi’s intervention, we would be refugees by now’”, Al-Masry Al-Youm, June 30, 2024, https://2h.ae/UVWxG  

[34] “Amr Adib: I will not grieve over Morsi’s death”, “Le360” website, June 18, 2019, https://ar.le360.ma/insolite/150763

[35] “Nashat El-Deehy exposes a ‘Brotherhood-Israeli’ plot to strike Egypt”, Al-Fagr, May 9, 2026, https://talkshow.elfagr.org/5299726

 [36] “Nashat El-Deehy: Trust the state and think well of it.. no reconciliation with the Brotherhood”, Al-Shorouk, November 26, 2024, https://2h.ae/MfyXv

[37] “Nashat El-Deehy: ‘Thank God that Mohamed Morsi died in front of people’s eyes’”, Bawabat Al-Fagr, June 17, 2019, https://talkshow.elfagr.org/3626809

[38] “Mustafa Bakry: President El-Sisi saved Egypt from collapse during the Brotherhood’s rule”, Al-Dostour, January 29, 2026, https://www.dostor.org/5400654 [39] “Mohamed Al-Baz: Morsi’s death revealed to us an enormous number of sleeper cells”, Al-Dostour, June 18, 2019, https://www.dostor.org/2675881

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